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Abstract: The aim of this article is to provide an evolutionarily grounded explanation of central
aspects of the structure of language. It begins with an account of the evolution of human causal
reasoning. A comparison between humans and non-human primates suggests that human causal
cognition is based on reasoning about the underlying forces that are involved in events, while other
primates hardly understand external forces. This is illustrated by an analysis of the causal cognition
required for early hominin tool use. Second, the thinking concerning forces in causation is used
to motivate a model of human event cognition. A mental representation of an event contains two
vectors representing a cause as well as a result but also entities such as agents, patients, instruments
and locations. The fundamental connection between event representations and language is that
declarative sentences express events (or states). The event structure also explains why sentences are
constituted of noun phrases and verb phrases. Finally, the components of the event representation
show up in language, where causes and effects are expressed by verbs, agents and patients by nouns
(modified by adjectives), locations by prepositions, etc. Thus, the evolution of the complexity of
mental event representations also provides insight into the evolution of the structure of language.
Keywords: causal cognition; event representation; evolution of language; sentence structure; word classes
1. Introduction
Human languages show a great deal of variation, but there are features that seem
to be universal. In the Chomskyan tradition, such features are postulated to derive from
an innate universal grammar. Within this tradition, however, evolutionary accounts of
the universal grammar have focused on the role of recursion [1] (or, in Chomsky’s later
writings, e.g., [2], the rule of ‘merge’), but Jackendoff [3] and Heine and Kuteva [4] have
presented some more general principles. In this article, my aim is to provide answers
to some fundamental questions concerning the structure of language on the basis of an
account of the evolution of human causal cognition.
In regards to the structure of language, I focus on three questions:
(1) Why are sentences central units in language?
In all languages, sentences are fundamental units, but evolutionary linguists have
hardly considered why this is so. My answer is, in brief, that sentences express events, and
events are basic units of human causal thinking.
(2) Why do sentences consist of noun phrases and verb phrases?
My answer to this question also derives from the structure of mental models of events.
(3) Why are words in languages divided into classes?
Again, I propose that common word classes can be explained by how we think
about events.
The questions concerning the evolution of the structure of human language become
more acute when comparing it with language-trained apes and other animals communicate.
For example, bonobos produce sequences of signs without concern for whether they form
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sentences [5]. The complexity of human language is of a different order from what is found
in non-human animal communication. The story of how the structure of language emerged
in the hominin line is long, and it no doubt involved several steps.
The overarching question is, therefore, what happened to the human mind during
our evolutionary past that can explain why our communication exhibits such structural
complexity. In this article, my aim is to derive an answer to this question from an account of
the evolution of human thinking about causality. My argumentation consists of three main
steps: (i) A comparison between humans and non-human primates suggesting that human
causal cognition is based on the reasoning about the underlying forces that are involved in
phenomena, while other primates hardly understand external forces. I illustrate this by an
analysis of the causal cognition required for early hominin tool use (Section 2). (ii) As a
further evolutionary step, humans often organise causal relations in terms of events. I put
forward a model where a representation of an event contains two entities representing a
cause as well as a result, but also entities such as agents, patients, instruments and locations
(Section 3). Section 4 is devoted to showing how communication about events yields
evolutionary benefits. In particular, it opens up for cooperation about future goals. (iii) The
components of the event representation show up in the structure of language, which will
make it possible to answer the three questions above. Sentences form natural units since
they refer to events (or states). In regards to word classes, causes and effects are expressed
by verbs, agents and patients by nouns (modified by adjectives), locations by prepositions,
etc. (Section 5). In conclusion, the evolution of the complexity of mental event components
also provides clues to the evolution of the complex structure of language (Section 6).
2. What Is Special about Human Causal Cognition?
2.1. Non-Human Primate Reasoning about Causes
As background to the evolution of causal cognition in hominins, I present a summary
of some of the findings concerning the abilities of non-human primates to reason with
causes. This area goes back to Köhler [6], who, in his ground breaking experiments on
chimpanzee planning, observed that apes had great difficulties in stacking boxes in order
to be able to reach a banana that was hanging from the ceiling. He observes that when
Sultan, the most cognitively proficient chimpanzee, tried to put a second box on top of a
first, instead of doing so “as might seem obvious, began to gesticulate with it, . . . he put
it beside the first, then in the air diagonally above, and so forth”. Similar observations of
other apes, led Köhler to the conclusion that “there is practically no statics to be noted in
the chimpanzee” ([6] (p. 149) and [7,8]).
When comparing causal cognition in non-human primates and in the hominin clade,
it is useful to distinguish between cued (externally signalled) and detached mental rep-
resentations [6,9]. A cued representation refers to something in the current (or recently
experienced) external situation of the experiencer. When, for example, a chimpanzee uses
two stones to crack nuts, it represents one of them as support (anvil) and the other as the
hammerstone. By contrast, detached representations stand for objects or events that are
not present in the subject’s current or recent external context and thus cannot trigger the
representation directly. (This notion of detachment is related to Hockett’s [10] “displace-
ment”, which is one of the criteria he uses to characterise what constitutes a language, but
his criterion has a behaviourist touch to it).
An example is that when a chimpanzee plans to fish for termites with, it walks away
and breaks off a thin stick from a tree, preparing it to fish with [11]. Forming mental images
of the manufactured stick and how it is to be used are detached representations that become
part of the chimpanzee’s plan.
An individual that has detached representations can create an inner world where
consequences of different actions or events can be simulated [12–14]. Spreng and Grady
([15], p. 1112) argue that “remembering one’s past, imagining one’s future, and imagining
the thoughts and feelings of others . . . are similar in that they all involve simulating an
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experience that is distinct from stimulus-driven behaviour”. Such simulations are central
to abstract causal reasoning.
Being able to reason from inanimate effects to non-present causes seems, at present, to
be unique to humans. There is a plethora of experiments and observations that indicate
that primates cannot infer physical causes from their effects (e.g., [16,17]). For example,
Cheney and Seyfarth’s [16] experiments with vervet monkeys showed that when catching
sight of a predator, they emit warning cries. However, the same monkeys do not react to
detached visual signs such as the trail of a snake or the carcass of an antelope in a tree,
which indicates a leopard in the vicinity. Thus, while non-human primates are dependent
on direct physical effects, it seems that the aptitude for causal understanding based on
inanimate or indirect sensory cues evolved only in the hominin species [18–20].
The claim that reasoning from effects to non-present causes is unique to humans has
been contended by other researchers. For example, in a study by Völter and Call [21] it was
shown that chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas can follow a trail left by a leaking yoghurt
cup that was placed out of their sight to locate the yoghurt. A limitation of the result is that
the apes did not use the trail when it did not match the food that was displaced—that is,
when it could not be linked directly through sight, smell or taste.
Additional support for the thesis that non-human primates cannot reason about causes
that are not perceived comes from an experiment by Civelek et al. [22] that examined how
children and chimpanzees reasoned about unseen causes. The subjects saw a reward being
dropped through an opaque forked tube into one of two cups. A sound signalled in which
of the cups the reward was to be found. In one condition, the sound followed the dropping
event, indicating that the cue was caused by the reward falling into the cup, and in another
condition, the sound preceded the dropping event. Four-year-old children performed
better in the first condition than in the second, which suggests that they understood the
unseen cause. Chimpanzees and three-year-old children, however, performed at chance in
both conditions.
Furthermore, Povinelli [17] presented some experiments which also indicate that
chimpanzees (and other primates) have problems reasoning about the effects of gravitation
on objects. These experiments have led to further investigations [23–26], and there is an
ongoing debate (see [27,28]). Povinelli and Penn ([29], p. 77) conclude that “only humans
are capable of second-order relational reasoning, and only humans, therefore, have the
cognitive machinery that can support higher-order, theory-like, causal relations”. Johnson-
Frey ([30], p. 201) also writes: “Comparative studies of chimpanzee tool use indicate that
critical differences are likely to be found in mechanisms involved in causal reasoning rather
than those implementing sensorimotor transformations”.
In a study comparing the nut-cracking performances of humans and chimpanzees [31],
the result was that humans understood how to apply force to extract numerous nut species
through using hammerstones. In contrast, chimpanzees only applied hammerstones to
Panda nuts, although they regularly eat hard Irvingia nuts using their teeth. Chimpanzees
in other groups and regions cracked different nut types with hammerstones [32,33], but
a single group do not use hammerstones to obtain several food sources. This example
illustrates how humans, in contrast to chimpanzees, reason more abstractly about the
causal effects of applying tool-assisted forces. This allows humans to generalize a particular
solution to a wider range of problems.
Non-human animals can reason about an event involving actions—their own or those
of others. The important step in reaching the more general event representation presented
in the following section comes when not only actions but also other types of forces can
function as causes in events. The ability to reason causally about detached forces—and not
just actions, the human mind has evolved an extended capacity to reason and to plan that
surpasses that of other primate species.
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2.2. Human Reasoning about Forces
The human capacity to reason about of physical forces develops early in infants.
Michotte [34] showed that if one object moving on a screen came into contact with another
object and the other object began moving in the same direction, then adults perceived
a causal relation between the two movements. If the second object only began moving
500 milliseconds after the collision, however, the time difference eliminated the impression
of causality. Michotte’s experiments were performed with six-month-old infants by Leslie
and Keeble [35]. The result was that the infants reacted differently to the two types of
events. Leslie [36] argues that infants have a special system in their brains for mapping
the “forces” of objects. Wolff and his collaborators [37–41] have collected further evidence
supporting that people can directly perceive the forces that lie behind different kinds of
events. The upshot is that the sensory input generated by the movements of an object is
sufficient for the brain to automatically calculate the forces that lead to the movements [42].
Adults can also combine physical causes in their reasoning, as shown by Wolff [37].
The study showed that they can estimate the combined forces of a boat motor and the wind
and to determine how the boat crosses a lake. Göksun et al. [43] extended this to a study of
3–5-year-olds. In addition to one-force events, the children were asked to predict the path
of a ball that was influenced by two forces that were combined to reflect force dynamics
patterns of “cause”, “enable” and “prevent”. The result was that while children could
successfully reason about the one-force events, they had problems with a second force,
incorporating it only if the two forces move in the same direction. The older the children,
the more successful they were in accounting for the effects of the second force [44]. These
experiments suggest that human abstraction and reasoning about physical forces develop
over age, although the general system for perceiving forces as causes is present already at
an early age.
As humans, we do not only reason about physical forces but also about how psycho-
logical and social factors influence us. The increasing complexity of hominin societies has
generated a highly developed “theory of mind”, that is, an understanding of how our
emotions, desires, intentions and beliefs lead to different kinds of interactions between
people [13,45–48]. By observing the actions of ourselves and others and through vari-
ous processes of social learning, we infer the state of mind of other humans under the
hypothesis that their theory of mind is similar to our own.
In such cases, we do not perceive the cause of another’s actions physically, but use
our understanding of their inner state as a causal variable for their behaviours. This
involves a separation of perceptual similarities from the causal ones that are determined
from emotions, desires, intentions and beliefs. Thus, the mental entities form a class of
hidden variables that act as social forces and which we add to our perception in order
to understand causal relations. A theory of mind is, therefore an important extension of
human causal cognition [49].
2.3. Tool Manufacture and Use Were Selective Factors for Reasoning about Forces
From an evolutionary perspective, the central question becomes: Why did only
hominins evolve causal thinking that is based on forces? Gärdenfors and Lombard [50]
argue that tool manufacture and use were contributing factors to advanced forms of causal
reasoning. The key to the argument is that tools extend the potential of the hominins to act
across space and time.
As regards spatial cognition, the visual field of primates is divided into peri-personal
and extra-personal space. The peri-personal space (the region within reach around the
body), makes it possible for an individual to see its field of action. Tool use extends the peri-
personal space [51,52]). Even further extensions of the peri-personal space are achieved
when the tool leaves direct control of the body and exerts its force at a distance—entering
extra-personal space, which may have stimulated the development of causal reasoning
about external forces [50]. For example, throwing an object, as many primates do, may
be the first method of exerting a force at a distance (see [53] for a speculative account).
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Chimpanzees, however, do not hunt by throwing. When they hunt bushbabies with
sharpened sticks, they thrust with direct force [54]. Apes do not have the accuracy, force
and speed that make human throwing so effective and so dangerous [55].
Sometime during hominin evolution, the display function of throwing in apes was
replaced by a physical function with the aim to hurt or kill prey or opponents. A thrower
that could reason about the physical effects at a distance of a stone or a spear would be
more successful in hunting or warfare than an individual that could not [56]. The transition
from actions to forces as causes is a critical step in the evolution of causal reasoning that
can be traced through the use of hunting tools and weapons. The mapping between cause
and effect must be inferred from the consequences of the throw (for example, from the
behaviour of an animal or enemy that is hit). From the archaeological record, it would
seem that Homo neanderthalensis shared the capacity for such reasoning with early Homo
sapiens [57–59]. Homo erectus, on the other hand, may have been limited to thrusting
weapons [60,61], wherein causal understanding was identified through the stabber’s own
bodily action.
An even more complex form of causal force is the use of poisoned arrows that operates
for an extended period of time, sometimes across a long distance, and often out of the sight
of the hunter (see [50,62]. When preparing and using a poisoned arrow, the hunter must
rely on advanced forms of abstract causal reasoning and long-term planning.
To sum up this section, non-human animals understand causation only in terms of
agency, while humans can also reason about causes in a detached way via forces that
operate across space (action at a distance) and time. Among the forces, one also finds the
mental variables that are involved in an extended theory of mind.
3. Event Cognition
3.1. A Cognitive Model of Events
In this section, I turn to the relation between causal thinking and event cognition. A
considerable part of human cognition depends on representations of events [63–67]. We use
events in causal reasoning, planning and communication. As I argue below, our episodic
memory also depends on event structures [66].
A central feature of events is that they are based on causal relations: An event typically
contains information about an agent who is the cause of an action that leads to a result
related to a patient. Although event representations generally contain an agent, some do
not involve any, for example, events of raining, falling, drowning, dying and growing. A
representation of an event may also contain other “thematic roles” such as instrument,
recipient and beneficiary [68,69]. Agents and patients are object categories with different
properties. It is assumed that an agent is able to act, which in the proposed framework
amounts to exerting forces. The core idea of the event model presented in [63] and [65] is
that an event contains two vectors—the force of an action that drives the event, and the
result of the force (see Figure 1) (More formal details of the model can be found in [63–65]).
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Figure 1. The main components of an event representation. ti .
An action is modelled as a force vector (or a pattern of force vectors as in running).
The result of an event is modelled as a change vector representing the change of properties
of the patient [63,67]. For example, when Oscar (the agent) pushes (the force vector) a table
(the patient), the force exerted makes the table move (the result vector). Or, when Victoria
boils the carrots, the result is that the carrots become soft. When the result vector is just
a point (a null vector), that is, when the result is no change, then the event is a state. An
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important feature of the event model is that it captures a basic sense of causation: The
action of the agent causes the change in the patient. The distinction between forces and
changes of states [37,39], results in the fundamental division between causes and effects. A
special case of the event model, expressed linguistically by intransitive constructions such
as “Victoria is walking” and “Oscar is jumping”, is when the patient is identical with the
agent. In this case, the agent exerts a force on itself. In other words, the agent modifies its
own position or property in some domain of agent space (=patient space).
In philosophy and psychology, the causal relationship between the action and the
effect is typically analysed as being between two events (see [70,71]). In contrast, the
proposed model describes causation as a relation within an event. Furthermore, in contrast
to traditional philosophical theories, the distinction between forces and changes of states
also entails that the cause and the result are represented as two different kinds of entities.
To be sure, humans also reason about another form of causation, that is, generic causal
relations, for example, “eating toadstools will make you sick” and “lions kill people” [72].
Such generics concern relations between concepts and not causation within single events.
There exist many attempts within economics and philosophy to reduce this kind of causal
relation to information theory in terms of the probabilities involved (e.g., [73,74]). However,
in the case of “lions kill people” the probability of a lion killing someone is much lower
than many other causes of death, so the content of the generic is very low if measured in
terms of general information or entropy. Gärdenfors and Osta Vélez [72] argue that the
strength of the generic depends on the frequency of the characteristic category that is in
focus relative to a contrast class. In the case of “lions kill people”, this would mean that
the proportion of lions that kill people is higher than the corresponding proportion for
most other animals. The relevant contrast class is, however, context-dependent so that
transforming this into an information-theoretic measure would involve several factors. I
will return to the role of generics in Section 5.1.
Another aspect is that the forces are not the only components involved in human
causal reasoning, but counterforces (forces exerted by the patient or contextual forces such
as gravitation) are also accounted for. This aspect was pioneered in Talmy’s [75] “force
dynamics” and is further developed in Wolff’s [37–39] dynamics model. Depending on
how the “affector” force vector (produced by an agent) is related to a “patient” force vector
to generate a result vector, subjects judge that the affector force either causes, enables or
prevents an effect. These results indicate that subjects make a distinction between different
kinds of causal relations. Talmy’s force dynamics is grounded in physical events, but it can
also be used to represent psychological or social forces where components of a theory of
mind are exploited.
3.2. Event Cognition, Planning and Episodic Memory
A central question is what have been the evolutionary selective factors that resulted in
the extended human dependence on mental representations of events. A main part of the
answer is that detached event cognition allows us to speculate about potential outcomes of
actions, test and re-adjust our imaginative hypotheses, and shift attention from one target
to another. It thereby allows generalisation by comparing the force and result in one event
with those of another [64].
In particular, different forms of planning involve event cognition. A plan consists of a
series of imagined actions as causes together with the expected effects of the actions. For
example, a hunter imagines a series of events, some related to the previous movements
of an animal, some as part of a plan to kill or catch it. An anthropological example is that
when hunting with poisoned arrows, Kalahari San engage in “speculative tracking”, using
working hypotheses gained from the signs left by an animal, socially and experientially
gained knowledge about the behaviours of the animal and of the landscape in which
the tracking is taking place [76]. This imagination may also involve an understanding of
the mental state of the animal, for example, that the animal is overheated or dehydrated.
Based on these imagined reconstructions, the hunter creates predictions in ever changing
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circumstances involving a continuous cognitive process [77]. The upshot is that event
cognition allows for ever more complex causal thinking to evolve.
One must, however, distinguish between immediate planning for present goals and
prospective planning for future goals (Gulz [78] calls prospective planning anticipatory
planning, a term that was also used in [13,79]). The crucial distinction is that for an
individual to be capable of prospective planning, it must have a detached representation of
its future goals. In contrast, immediate planning only depends on the current goals.
Several researchers have argued that the prospective skill for planning for future
needs is exclusive to humans (e.g., [6,80–82]). This has been called the Bischof–Köhler
hypothesis. In the light of recent experimental results, the hypothesis can, however, no
longer be upheld. Great apes are not only able to select tools for future use [83,84], but
also to save tools that have currently been used to obtain future goals [85]. The studies
strongly suggest that great apes are able to outcompete current drives in favour of future
ones [84,86] (This ability to plan for future needs also seems to have evolved independently
in the avian taxon of corvids [87,88]).
My hypothesis that humans have more sophisticated cognitive representations of
events than other species fits well with the theory that humans have an advanced episodic
memory, allowing us to remember single events and the order in which they occurred [89,90].
The main neural correlate for both prospective planning and episodic memory is
the hippocampal complex (hippocampus together with entorhinal cortex). Brain imaging
shows that this complex is active in humans, both when they recall past events and when
they imagine future ones [91]. The hippocampus can map out planned spatial paths,
but also paths in other conceptual spaces [92,93]. This connection may be part of the
explanation of why the hippocampus is central to both navigation and episodic memory—
two seemingly unrelated cognitive capacities.
Related to episodic memory, the event model can handle what-if questions, that is,
counterfactual reasoning concerning what would have happened if an action would have
been different [94]. For example: “If I had hit the flint core less hard, it would not have
broken”. Counterfactual reasoning seems to develop fully only relatively late in childhood.
To wit, Rafetseder et al. [95] found that such reasoning is not fully developed in all children
before 12 years of age, some of whom still lack an understanding of events that are causally
dependent on counterfactual assumptions. According to Markovits’ [96] developmental
patterns of conditional reasoning, fully developed counterfactual causal understanding is
only reached between the ages of 14 and 16 (also see [97] on adolescent brain development
in relation to counterfactual reasoning).
Apart from counterfactual reasoning, humans can also reason in terms of omissive
causation, which concerns events that do not occur. For example, the fact that a hunter
did not bring his spear caused him to be attacked by a lion. For many other models of
causation, it is difficult to explain omissive causation, but the event model can also handle
this (see [41,75,98]).
4. How Event Cognition Improves Communication
After these presentations of causal cognition and its role in mental representations of
events, it is time to discuss the role of these systems in the evolution of language. Before
I turn to how they influence the basic structure of language, this section is devoted to a
presentation of what I view as the main evolutionary benefits of event representations
in communication.
First of all, there are several levels of communication that are important to distinguish
in an evolutionary setting. They will be introduced in Section 4.1. Next, symbolic words
allow communication about things that are not present in the context. This will be the
topic of Section 4.2. Many types of communicative tasks can be completed by using single
words or a combination of a few words (or iconic signs). There are, however, two types
of communicative situations, both unique to humans, where more complex linguistics
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structures are employed, namely cooperation for future goals (Section 4.3) and narratives
(Section 4.4).
4.1. Levels of Communication
It is useful to distinguish three levels of communication, in addition to a basic level
of cooperation.
Level 0: Praxis. On this level, individuals interact with each other without using
intentional communication.
If everybody in a cooperating group performs their assignments as expected, there is
no need for explicit communication.
Level 1: Evaluation and instruction. On this level, valuations of the actions of others
and of objects can be expressed by non-verbal approval or disapproval. The coordination
of actions is achieved by instruction, expressed by wishes or demands. Linguistically, this
is typically achieved by imperatives.
This form of communication is found in non-human animals and is among the first to
develop in human infants.
Level 2: Coordination of common ground. On this level, individuals inform each other
in order to be better coordinated. This is typically achieved via declaratives, but also
questions can be used.
On this level communication in the form of sentences becomes central.
Level 3: Coordination of meanings. On this highest level, individuals negotiate the
meanings of words (signs).
This is the most advanced level, which assumes a meta-awareness of how lan-
guage functions.
In the following, level 2 will be in focus since this is where human communication
separates from that of other species.
4.2. Referring to Absent Objects
If the goal of collaboration is present in the current environment, for example, food to
be gathered or an enemy to be fended off, the individuals need not communicate before
acting. In contrast, if the goal is distant in time or space, then a shared representation of
the goal must be obtained before cooperation can take place. For example, constructing a
common dwelling involves coordinated planning of how to procure the building material
and how to collaborate in the construction. Level 2 is therefore essential for cooperation
about future goals.
A decisive difference between a symbolic language and the signals employed by
animals is that signals only refer to what is present in the environment of the animal.
For example, vervets only give warning calls when danger is immediate. Signals are
about the surrounding world, while symbols often refer to our inner worlds, that is, to
our imaginations, memories, plans and dreams. With the aid of symbols, humans can
communicate about things that are not here and now or that may not even exist.
The use of symbols replaces cues from the environment in communication. If somebody
has an idea about a common goal, she can use symbolic language to convey her thoughts.
Furthermore, symbols make it possible for us to coordinate our knowledge, thereby creating
a “common ground” [99] that can be exploited to create new forms of cooperation.
The possibility of referring to detached entities makes new forms of cooperation
possible. In this way, a communicative system that makes it possible for members of a
group to share mental representations of non-present entities becomes selectively advanta-
geous [100,101].
To some extent, referring to objects that are not present on the scene can be done by
just pointing [102]. For example, prelinguistic children about 12 months old can sometimes
refer metonymically to an absent person by pointing to a place where that person has
recently been or is normally located [103]. Chimpanzees can refer to absent objects by
pointing, but only to invisible objects they know to be present [104]. They also point
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imperatively (level 1), while infants point declaratively (level 2) [105]. Pointing gestures
are also frequently reintroduced in storytelling. Their function then is to give a visual
complement to what the words point to in mental space [106,107] and [108] (p. 40) calls this
“deixis at phantasma”. In this way, pointing begins to allow a “meeting of minds” [109].
Transiting from an animal signalling system to a fully symbolic language requires sev-
eral steps. Bickerton [110] and other researchers [111–113], argue that during the evolution
of language there was a stage when a protolanguage, which contained only the semantic
components of language, was used. These authors, claim that Homo erectus mastered a
protolanguage, and it only when Homo sapiens emerged on the scene when a language
with a fully grammatical structure evolved. Everett [112] distinguishes between three
levels of grammaticality (see [3] for another account of intermediary steps of grammatical
evolution). The coordination of the common ground required for the forming of a common
plan for future actions can possibly be achieved in a communication system that lacks
syntax, that is, in a protolanguage. Nevertheless, as I argue in Section 5, some grammatical
structure is needed in order to solve problem related to role assignments.
4.3. Communication for Future Cooperation
There exist many forms of cooperation in animals, for example, cooperative hunting,
but the planning involved is individual, bound to the current context, and is not commu-
nicated intentionally. Of course, animals are reading the behaviour and maybe even the
intentions of other individuals and use that to determine their own behaviour. This can be
seen as a form of communication that improves cooperation, but it is not intentional.
When the planning involves several individuals, then variables of a theory of mind,
such as the desires and intentions of other individuals, will also be part of the plan. For
example, planning for collaborative hunting typically involves adjusting the plan to the
presumed intentions of the other participants.
In contrast, planning for future collaboration seems to be more or less unique to
the hominin line [100,114]. It essentially involves coordinating goals, which presumes
several forms of coordination of common ground: coordination where something will be
done (often outside the present visual field), joint reference to absent objects, coordination
of goals and coordination of actions. This coordination is improved if the collaborators
structure the plans in terms of future events. Thus, the evolution of event cognition made
more advanced forms of collaboration possible.
Such planning requires that joint intentions are formed, which is an advanced form
of the theory of mind, presumably unique to humans [13,45,48,115]. A joint plan can
be analysed as a combination of forming a joint intention and coordinating actions. In
previous work [13,45,79,101,116,117]. I have argued that symbolic language makes efficient
cooperation about future goals possible. Along the same lines, Tylén et al. [118] (p. 6) write:
Analogous to the way that manual tool use has been shown to enlarge the
peripersonal space by extending the bodily action potential of arm and hand
in space . . . , linguistic symbols liberate human interactions from the temporal
and spatial immediacy of face-to-face and bodily coordination and thus radically
expand the interaction space.
During the evolution that led to Homo sapiens, our hominin ancestors developed new
forms of cooperation that made it possible to organise their societies in new ways. It
is generally agreed that hominins evolved in open landscapes in which the individual
travelled over long ranges [119]. Cooperative foraging could have been caused by increased
seasonality and variability in the environments.
The Oldowan culture—the first along the Homo lineage—was signified by an exten-
sion in time and space [120]. There is clear evidence that the transport of artefacts (at
least stone tools) was an important trait of the culture [121]. Isaac [120] also speculates
that division of labour was present in the Oldowan culture. Such arrangements presume
coordination of activities, which is an indication of detached communication. The more
complex a culture is, the more effort must be made to preserve the complexity. Donald [122]
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writes: “Memory for a variety of special skills usually involves some division of labour,
as well as a collaborative strategy for passing those skill on to every new generation”.
Therefore, teaching about the environment and different procedures for food procuration
became increasingly important [123,124].
Division of labour involves role taking. Spontaneous role taking can occasionally be
found in social hunting in some non-human species, for example, chimpanzees [125]. If the
role taking is flexible, however, so that an individual, for example, sometimes drives the
game, sometimes acts as a lookout or sometimes waits in ambush, then each participant
must have a representation of the roles of the other team members [126,127]. This also
involves joint intentionality about the activities of the team [47]. Furthermore, if the
role taking is part of a plan, then the roles must be communicated in some way. As
I argue in Section 5.2, communication about role assignments maps onto fundamental
syntactic principles.
The analysis presented here dovetails with Smith [128] (p. 241), who argues that
linguistic communication has the following benefits for cooperation:
(1) Simplifies otherwise difficult coordination problems, especially those involving many
agents and planning for future events;
(2) Reduces the cost of enforcing adherence to collectively beneficial norms;
(3) Enhances the efficiency of signals, including those which provide collective goods;
(4) Facilitates the positive assortment of individuals who adhere to similar norms and con-
ventions.
4.4. Who Did What to Whom? The Adaptive Benefits of Gossip
In social species, individuals often must decide whether to cooperate or not. Within
game theory, in the investigations of prisoners’ dilemmas and similar conflict situations, it
is taken for granted that the players know who the potential collaborators are. In practice,
however, the most important question is: How do you know whom to cooperate with?
Dessalles [111] (p. 360) writes: “Some of our ancestors who belonged to the first species of
Homo, say, began to form sizeable coalitions. In such a “political” context, finding good
allies becomes essential”. Sharing information about the other members of the group is an
important special case of coordinating common knowledge.
Reciprocal altruism (“you scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours”) is found in sev-
eral animal species. Such cooperation presumes trust between two individuals. Indirect
reciprocity is a more extreme form of altruism: “I help you, and somebody else will help
me”. This form of cooperation involves a group of individuals. The conditions for indirect
reciprocity to evolve as an evolutionarily stable strategy have been investigated [129,130].
The key concept in Nowak and Sigmund’s [129] evolutionary model is that of the reputation
of an individual: An individual X’s reputation is built up from how members of the society
observe X’s behaviour towards third parties and then how this information is spread to
other members of the society. The higher the reputation of X, the more other individuals
are willing to cooperate with X.
The communication required for functioning forms of indirect reciprocity typically
concerns whom you can trust. The information is generally conveyed in the absence of
the individual who is evaluated. This process makes gossip becomes an important way
of achieving consensus about reputation [131,132]. In this way, the information that X
is a “selfless” helper can be shared knowledge within the group. T X’s reputation can
then be evaluated by any individual who needs to decide whether or not to assist X in
a troublesome situation. Evidently, reputation cannot be directly observed by others in
the same way as such status markers as a raised tail among wolves. In contrast, each
individual must keep an account of the reputation of the other individuals with whom she
considers interacting. Semmann et al. [133] experimentally demonstrate that building a
reputation through cooperation is valuable for future social interactions, not only within
but also beyond one’s social group. Gossip, therefore, plays a central role in the evolution
of language.
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Gossip typically contains expressions of the form “X did A to Y”, which require
thematic roles such as agent, action and patient to be identified. A communication system
that communicates this form of messages must be able to (a) refer to individuals in their
absence, for example, by names, (b) express that “X was good to Y” and “Y was bad to
X” and (c) to keep track of the roles of X and Y. In order to evaluate X and Y as potential
collaborators, such expressions are clear examples of ascribing roles to persons. They are
also difficult to convey without ambiguity within a protolanguage: without markers for
roles, since “X was good to Y” can then not be distinguished from “Y was good to X”. Such
a system must thus contain some forms of syntax, maybe of the first type described by
Everett [112].
Providing information about whom to cooperate with is a central function of gossip,
but not the only one. Dunbar [131] argues that it functions as a replacement for grooming
and thus results in stronger bonding between individuals. Furthermore, other forms of
information about individuals not related to their trustworthiness can also be important in
the complex net of strategic interactions between the members of a group.
I have now presented two forms of communication for cooperation where sentences
are required: coordination of future goals and gossip. Both types typically take the form
of narratives. Pragmatically, their function is to coordinate the common knowledge of
the interlocutors (level 2). I am not claiming that communication on level 2 can only be
achieved by sentences. I have already pointed out that pointing and other forms of gestures
can also perform this function (see also [134]), and maybe even drawing could achieve this.
Nevertheless, sentential structures strongly amplify the efficiency of communication on
level 2.
What is important is that describing planned actions as well as information about
relations between different individuals are special cases of describing events. My hypothe-
sis is that the capacity to communicate about events is a crucial distinction between the
communication of language-trained apes and that of humans.
5. From Events to Sentences
In this section, I show how causal cognition and the structure of event representations
provide answers to the three questions concerning the fundamental structure of language
that were presented in the introduction.
5.1. Sentences Are Needed for the Coordination of Common Knowledge
There is one linguistic unit that is central to both types of communication discussed in
the previous section: the sentence. The first question on my list concerns why we organise
much of our communication in sentences. The Chomskyan tradition takes it for granted
that the goal of speaking is to generate sentences, having a minimal structure of a noun
phrase and a verb phrase. Within this tradition, the main problem is to decide whether
certain combinations of words are grammatical—the meaning of a sentence is secondary.
Furthermore, in cognitive linguistics, sentences are seen as natural units [69,135–138].
In analytic philosophy, sentences are also central units. In the tradition since Frege,
the content of a sentence is a proposition. As an answer to my first question, Frege writes
that the role of sentences is to express thoughts. This answer is simply not sufficient unless
it can be determined how a thought is to be identified (independently of language).
If one takes a cognitive perspective on communication, an explanation of why we
express ourselves in sentences is needed. My proposal is that the primary function of
sentences is that they refer to events. I next outline how a mental representation of an event
can be expressed in sentences describing different aspects of the event that are relevant to
the communicative situation. Not only what the interlocutors perceive, but also what they
are attending to, their current goals, their future plans and their previous communication
will influence how sentences are formed.
It is important that I am not claiming that all human communication takes the form of
sentences. First of all, from an evolutionary perspective, the focus should be on utterances
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rather than sentences. Utterances can only be evaluated in relation to a communicative
context that contributes to their meaning. In contrast, within philosophy (and to a large
extent also linguistics), it is assumed that sentences have a meaning that is independent of
the context. Second, there several forms of communication, for example, evaluative and
emotional expressions, requests and demands, which do not refer to events and which may
not even require symbolic structures.
My focus in this article is, however, the communication required for advanced co-
operation, and thus primarily for communication on level 2, that is, coordinating inner
worlds. For this task, sentences prove their mettle. In present-day human communication,
sentential structures are so entrenched in the linguistic structure that they are also used for
communication on level 1, which is evaluative expressions and demands, and on level 3,
which is, coordinating meanings of words and other meta-functions of language.
Events are complex phenomena, and they cannot be exhaustively described. Before
a sentence can be generated, it must first be decided which information to include. A
speaker has the liberty to express different perspectives on the same event. The choice of
perspective determines what is expressed in a sentence. In cognitive linguistics, this choice
is called the construal of the sentences. One manner of expressing different perspectives is
via the choice of grammatical construction. For example, in “Victoria paints Oscar’s face”,
Victoria is more in focus, while in the passive construction “Oscar’s face is painted by
Victoria” the focus is on Oscar’s face. One must therefore distinguish two different levels
of meaning: (i) the representation of an event and (ii) a construal that picks out certain
aspects of the event.
How is a construal of an event determined? The attention of the speaker is a selection
mechanism for a cognitive event representation, as seen in the example above. There are,
however, other aspects of how a construal is formed (see [139] (Ch. 3) for a survey). One
is perspective: For example, if you and I are standing on two sides of a house, I can say
that you are behind the house if I put myself in the centre (egocentric view), or I can say
that you are in front of the house if I put the house and the direction of its main side in
focus (allocentric view). By analogy with the visual process, a construal focuses only on
certain parts of an event. For example, the sentences “Oscar sprayed paint on the wall” and
“Oscar sprayed the wall with paint” describe the same event with the aid of two different
construals. The difference between them is that in the first, “paint” is focused on as the
patient of the action, while in the second, “the wall” is made the patient [69] (p. 124). The
attention process is then applied to select the force or the result vector of the event model,
generating a construal that can be used in the language production model. For example,
in “Oscar scrubs the floor”, the force vector is selected for the construal, while in “Oscar
cleans the floor”, it is the result that is in focus.
On the basis of the notion of a construal of an event, I can now formulate a fundamental
connection between the semantics of sentences (utterances) and events. Jackendoff [140]
(p. 327) makes a similar proposal: “[T]he category corresponding to a sentence is an event
or a state rather than a truth value”. However, his event model is algebraic rather than
geometric, as proposed here).
Thesis about sentences: A (declarative) sentence expresses a construal of an event.
In linguistics, a tight mapping between linguistic expressions and construals of events
is in general assumed [141]. DeLancey [142] provides good linguistic arguments why
events must be distinguished from their construals.
The thesis is constrained to declarative sentences. First, on communication level
1 (evaluation and instruction), evaluative expressions or imperatives are typically used
instead. Evaluative expressions need not even involve words but can consist of, for example,
an affirming nod. Since an imperative relates to the attitudes of the speaker and is normally
directed to the addressee, imperatives typically omit some event elements that occur in
sentences (“Salt please”). Second, on level 2 (coordination of common ground), a common
form of utterances are generics. They have a different function in communication in that
they provide information about the underlying semantic structure. Gärdenfors and Osta
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Vélez [72] distinguish between two kinds: (a) Property generics dealing with characteristic
properties of objects (”ducks lay eggs”), and (b) event generics dealing with causal relations
within event types (“sharks kill people”). Finally, in a seeming violation of the thesis,
there also exist declarative sentences used on communication level 2, such as the current
one, where information is given without referring to an event. Such sentences, however,
communicate abstract thoughts and thereby constitute advanced uses of language (and
meta-language) that have evolved at later stages.
5.2. Noun Phrases and Verb Phrases
The second question concerns why sentences are built up from noun phrases and verb
phrases. In Heine and Kuteva’s [4] “layers” of grammaticalisation, nouns constitute the
first layer and verbs the second. Nouns and verbs are also the only word classes that are
fairly stable cross-linguistically. Why are these classes so fundamental?
I submit that the answer to this question also derives from event cognition to wit, the
minimal construals of events. Agents and patients are linguistically expressed by nouns
(including names) or noun phrases and force vectors and results vectors by verbs.
Linguists distinguish between manner verbs and result verbs—where “manner verbs
specify as part of their meaning a manner of carrying out an action, while result verbs
specify the coming about of a result state” [143] (p. 21) (see also [138] (Ch. 1)). This
distinction maps directly to the distinction between force vectors and result vectors in
events. For example, “push” refers to the force vector of an event, “move” refers to changes
in the spatial domain of the result vector and “heat” refers to changes in the temperature
domain (Possible exceptions to this general rule are verbs such as “split” that describe
changes in which objects exist and verbs such as “give” that describe intentional actions
involving recipients. These are discussed in [63] (Section 10.3.2)).
There are four minimal combinations of elements from an event model that are
expressed as sentences: (i) agent + force vector (“Oscars scrubs”), (ii) agent + result vector
(“Oscar cleans”), (iii) patient + force vector (“the table is scrubbed”), and (iv) patient +
result vector (the table is cleaned). Each of these combinations yields a complete sentence.
This leads to the following thesis [63] (Ch. 11).
Thesis about event construals: A construal of an event contains at least one vector (force
or result) and at least one object (patient or agent).
This thesis requires that at least an agent or a patient (expressed by a noun phrase) and
a force vector or a result vector (expressed by a verb phrase) are parts of what is expressed
in a sentence. The model thus explains the basic distinction between nouns phrases and
verb phrases and why at least one of each typically occurs in a sentence. The thesis thereby
provides motivation for why a construction consisting of a noun phrase and a verb phrase
is a cognitive unit of communication.
However, the thesis is also supported by studies of grammaticalisation. Heine and
Kuteva [4] (p. 119) write: “All evidence from grammaticalisation leads to the same hy-
pothesis, namely that the earliest structure of human language was lexical in nature, first
consisting only of noun-like utterances before verbal utterances appeared, thereby making
it possible to form propositional constructions”.
In linguistics, events are often modelled using symbolic notation [140,144]. For exam-
ple, Rappaport Hovav and Levin [144] (p.116) represent the meaning of the verb “break”
as follows:
[[X ACT<MANNER>] CAUSE [Become [Y <BROKEN>]]]
This can be rendered as “X acts in a manner to cause Y to become broken”. In this kind of
analysis, however, the linguistic level is still present since the verb “break” reappears as
<BROKEN>.
The ACT-CAUSE-BECOME model of verb semantics presented by Rappaport Hovav
and Levin can, nevertheless, be mapped onto the present proposal. The ACT of the
formalism corresponds to the force vector, except that not all force vectors involve action.
The BECOME corresponds to the result vector (Goddard and Wierzbicka [145] argue that
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“happen to” fits better than “become”). CAUSE is the mapping from force vector to result
vector [64]. As should be clear by now, the model presented here is richer since the force
and result vectors are grounded in a theory of causal cognition. This connects the semantics
of causation and events directly to bodily and perceptual variables.
5.3. Other Word Classes
The third question concerns why the words of a language can be grouped into a small
number of classes. I have already motivated why there are nouns and verbs since they
express the most central components of an event. The basic constituents of events —agent,
patient, action and result—can, however, be augmented with other thematic roles such as
recipient (“Oscar handed Victoria a towel”) and instrument (“Oscar painted the house with
a roller”). Nouns and verbs can, however, be modified in many different ways. Heine and
Kuteva [4] show how nouns and verbs have historically been transformed to other word
classes. I will only briefly discuss adjectives and prepositions here. The semantic roles of
these and other word classes are treated more extensively in the second part of [63].
An adjective has two major communicative functions. The first is as a specification of a
noun (or noun phrase) that contributes to the identification of a referent. For example, if
you want somebody to fetch you a cup and there are several cups present in the context,
you specify it further by adding an adjective, saying “the blue cup” or “the large cup”.
The second function of an adjective is informative. You can say, “The stove is hot”, as a
warning to somebody. In linguistic terms, the adjective is then a complement to a copula
(“is”) or an intransitive verb (“the meal tastes wonderful”). The two functions of adjectives
may very well be cognitively separated. Therefore, it is not necessary that these functions
are expressed by one word class. In line with this, Dixon [146] (p. 30) notes that some
languages have two different word classes, one fulfilling the specification function and
another fulfilling the informative function. As a matter of fact, some words classified as
adjectives in English only have one of the functions: “afraid” and “alive” can only be used
informatively, and “absolute” and “main” can only be used as a specification [147].
Most prepositions can be grouped into two classes: locative, indicating where some-
thing is, and directional, indicating where something is going [148]. Locative prepositions
complement a noun (noun phrase) by specifying the location (a region) in the visuospatial
domain: “Put the plate in front of grandfather!” This function is required for instruction
and is similar to the specification function of adjectives. Another communicative function
is handled by directional prepositions. In a sentence such as “Oscar went to the river”, the
phrase “to the river” has the same function as a result verb: it specifies the result vector
of an event. It should be noted that in both functions, the preposition is combined with a
noun (or a noun phrase).
In communicating a plan for a collaboration, it is clear that both the specification
function of adjectives and the spatial information contained in prepositional constructions
add precision to the message. Even though a plan communicated by only nouns and
verbs may succeed, the communication typically gains in content by exploiting further
word classes.
6. Conclusions
In this article, I have argued that the evolution of causal cognition and event represen-
tations provides clues to the evolution of the complex structure of language. A consequence
of this approach is that the evolutionary processes that led to language were cognitive and
social, not primarily linguistic. Donald [122] (p. 2) writes: “If languages are products of
cognitive interactions in groups, this fact alone would demand a culture-first theory of
language genesis. . . . Archaeological evidence suggests that human ancestors were skilled
long before they were articulate. . . . Therefore the cognitive apparatus for refining skill must
have existed in some form before languages could emerge from group interactions”. This
position entails that most human cognitive functions had been chiselled out by evolution
before language appeared on the hominin scene. Language would not have evolved with-
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out these cognitive capacities, in particular advanced causal cognition, having a rich theory
of mind, representing events, having a memory system that includes episodic memory and
representing future goals [13,45,49,100].
In summary, my main thesis concerning the origins of linguistic structure is that
sentences are natural units in communication because human cooperation has benefitted
evolutionarily (and still benefits) from communication about events. I have argued that a
declarative sentence refers to an event (or a state as a special case). Non-human animals do
not refer to events since neither is their causal cognition rich enough nor do they have the
mental capacity to cooperate about future goals. Therefore, there has been no selection for
communication with a sentential structure in non-human species.
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